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666 COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. WAY. [18 C. (2d) 
been expressly found by the legislative bodies of the taxing 
units concerned, as required by the provisions of section 1.1. 
The instant refunding proceeding, contemplating the reduc-
tion of the assessment indebtedness by approximately two-
thirds and the cancellation of the aforementioned delinquent 
taxes prior to the fiscal year of 1939-1940, will restore the 
delinquent property to the tax roll so that the current and 
future taxes will be paid with respect to this latter, as well as ' 
other land in the road improvement district, and each par-
cel, rather than merely twelve, will assume its proper share of 
the tax burden. It is obvious that the taxpayers cannot be 
prejudiced by any diminution of their obligations. Where 
,the change' made in the existing law by the subsequent 
legi;lation redounds to the material advantage of the tax-
payers, there is no impairment of the taxpayers' contract 
rights. (Metropolitan Water District v. Toll, supra, at 
p. 429.) , 
None of the objections advanced by respondent against the 
legality of this refunding proceeding are, in our opinion, well 
taken.' .As section 1.1 of the Refunding Assessment Bond 
Act of 1935, as amended, impairs neither the rights of the 
general obligation bondholders nor those of the taxpayers, 
an(las its'provisions do not contravene any constitutional 
'inhibition, . it must be sustained as a valid legislative enact-
ment.. It therefore follows that it is the duty of the respond-
'entto: ID;ake';and prepare a diagram of the property within 
Road Improvement District No. 38 of the County of San Ber-
'nardino; and also to prepare a reassessment for the purpose 
of 'refunding the outstanding indebtedness of this district. 
<,'Let.the ,peremptory writ issue as prayed for. 
" 'Gibson, C~ J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., 
. concurred. 
"JB;OUSEft,J.-I dissent. 
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PAUL H. BRUNS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Proceedings-Board of Gov-
ernors-Conclusiveness of Recommendation.-The Board of 
Governors after adopting the findings of the local committee 
has jurisdiction to order a discipline more severe than that 
recommended without first hearing the cause de novo or taking 
additional evidence. 
[2] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Dishonesty-False Assur-
ances and Statements as to Action Filed.-The acceptance of 
a fee by an attorney from a client upon a false assurance 
that an action would be filed, and a later false statement that 
an action had been filed justify a suspension in excess of 
three months, notwithstanding a claim of the attorney that 
he was under a physical and mental strain at the time and 
that he attempted to make restitution. 
[3] Id.-Disbarment-Misconduct Toward Client-Negligence in 
Respect to Trust Funds.-Where an attorney participated 
in a business enterprise and opened a "trustee" bank account 
on which, he drew checks subsequently returned for insufficient 
funds, and where he failed to account for funds handled and 
offered no credible explanation of his failure to keep a record 
thereof, his disregard of the fiduciary relation and absence 
of fair dealing in handling the affairs of his ignorant, credu-
lous or impecunious clients, taken in conjunction with his 
past record and the apparent failure to profit by previous 
disciplinary action, justified his disbarment. 
PROCEEDINGS to review recommendation of disbarment. 
Petitioner disbarred . 
Paul H. Bruns in pro. per., L. J. Styskal and M. E. Barth 
for Petitioner. 
W. Eugene Craven and Joe Crider, Jr., for Respondent. 
3. See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-yearSupp. 411; 5 Am. Jur. 423. 
McK. Dig. References:' 1. Attorneys at Law, § 172 (3); 2. At-
torneys at Law, § 149 (4); 3. Attorneys at Law, § 140. 
Iii 
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THE COURT.-In two separate proceedings instituted 
before a local. administrative committee of The State Bar 
of·. California, petitioner was charged with (1) acceptance of 
a' fee 'from a client upon false assurances that a suit would 
be filed, misrepresenting to the client that suit had been filed 
although no;, legal . services of value were performed, and 
(2) ,misuse of funds, failure, to defend legal actions, refusal 
to; account for funds received,and other professional mis-
conduct, in. connection with petitioner's employment as an 
attorney by members of a milk producers' association. 
In the first proceeding the local committee recommended 
that petitioner ,be suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of three' months. In' the second proceeding the com-
mittee recommended, on the basis of the facts found together 
with petitioner's past record, a three year period of suspen-
sIon .. The causes were consolidated for presentation to the 
Board of Governors. When petitioner failed to appear be-
fore the board at the appointed time, after a postponement 
of the hearing had been granted at his request, the matter 
\vas taken under submission upon the record made before the " 
local committee together with petitioner's past record. The ' 
past record included a public reproval administered by the 
board on September 21, 1929, in disciplinary proceedings 
L. A. No. 284 and No. 285, and a three months' suspension 
ordered by this court on July 17, 1931. (Bruns v. State 
Bar, 213 Cal. 151 [1 Pac. (2d) 989].) Upon reviewing these 
records the board adopted the findings of the local com-
mittee, but recommended that petitioner be disbarred. 
[1] Petitioner contends that after adopting' the findings 
of the local committee, the Board of Governors had no juris-
diction to order a discipline more severe than that recom-
mended, without first hearing the cause de novo or taking 
additional evidence. A complete answer to this contention 
is found in Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal. (2d) 550 [107 Pac. 
(2d) 10], and cases there cited. See also Maggart v. State 
Bar, 7 Cal. (2d) 495 [61 Pac. (2d) 451]. Petitioner argues 
that if he had known that his punishment might be increased 
he would have appeared before the board. His absence was 
of his' own volition, however, after full opportunity to testify 
had been accorded him, and affords no basis for compelling 
the board to accept the committee's recommendations or to 
limit its jurisdiction. 
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The findings of the local committee correctly represent the 
facts shown by the record in each proceeding. 
First Proceeding, L. A. No. 1023 (3774): 
In 1939 one C. H. Englesby, who had first met petitioner a 
few weeks previously, consulted him as an attorney, present-
ing to him the case of his sister-in-law, Eliza Jane Fear, a 
destitute blind woman, over 8.0 years of age, who many years 
before had loaned her brother James various sums of money 
totaling, with interest, about $10,500, which he had failed 
to repay. The brother signed a note which was subsequently 
lost. A substantial portion of the amount borrowed was used 
to educate his two daughters. Mr. Englesby asked petitioner 
whether the money could be collected from the daughters, 
and petitioner advised that in his opinion not only did a good 
cause of action exist against them, but they could be com-
pelled to contribute to their aunt's SUpport. He agreed to 
handle the case for a fee of $100 and an additional $27.50 
for costs. These sums, he was told, would be saved by the 
aunt from her monthly pension check. 
[2] On August 5, 1939, Mr. Englesby paid petitioner 
$80 on the fee, and thereafter $12 toward costs, and peti-
tioner promised to file suit. On November 5, 1939, he told 
Mr. Englesby that an action had been filed. This statement 
was untrue. At the hearing before the local committee pe-
titioner claimed that under his fee arrangement he was not 
obligated to file suit until the full amount of the fee was 
paid. He advanced the necessity for research as another 
excuse for his failure to act. Very little research would have 
revealed that no cause of action existed in favor of the aunt 
against her nieces either for support or for the money loaned 
their father. The local committee gave petitioner every op-
portunity to make restitution before taking action on the 
charge against him. On May 29, 1940, he stated that he 
believed he could restore the money to his client within fif-
teen or twenty days. On August 21st, three months later, 
he had only repaid $65, and claimed that it had been impos-
sible for him to raise the rest of the money. 
Petitioner now argues that the evidence does not justify 
'an order of suspension or disbarment. He states that the 
giving of erroneous advice through ignorance is not pun-
ishable, and' that he honestly believed that a cause of 
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. ing for leniency he asserts that he was under a physical and 
mental strain at the time in question, and that he has at-
tempted to make restitution. These factors, however, can-
not excuse either the failure to take any action after most 
of the agreed fees had been collected, or the misrepresenta-
tion to the' client that an action had been filed. The evidence 
on this ma.tter would warrant the imposition of a longer 
period ,of suspension than the three months recommended 
by the local committee, and considered in conjunction with 
petitioner's. record of other misconduct, it affords strong 
-~upport for the order of disbarment recommended by the 
Board of Governors. 
Second proceeding, L. A. No. 1005 (3711): 
In February, 1938, certain milk producers, assisted by pe-
titioner and one Gray, organized the Producers' Coopera-
tive Creamery Company, a copartnership, for the purpose 
'of processing and selling their milk at better prices than 
those' previously .. ·. received from. dairies. The producers,. of 
Holland Dutch' descent, had difficulty in speaking or under-
'standing. tlie;English . language, and relied upon petitioner to 
-advise them:'~',_They . were unsuccessful in their business and 
in July, 1938,. they decided to leave the plant they had leased 
and to abandon' operations. During the period from Febru-
'ary to July/1938,petitioner acted as attorney for Mr. Gray 
and for the: producers,· but he had nothing to do with the 
:managemeht 'of the business or the funds. Mr. Gray, how-
"ever; \was·~also interested in a selling organization called. the 
. Dairy; Guild." He and petitioner succeeded in obtaining the 
permission; o:ir~ the producers to sell their milk, after it was 
, ;processed cat: Guernsey Gold Seal Farms. In .August, 1938, 
-this!arrangement was put into operation. The. producers 
: deliv'ered-· milk, to . the Guernsey Gold Seal Farms for proc-
~essing.' ,It:was then sold by Mr. Gray, doing business.as the 
;:D~iry:Guild:.;jPetitioner participated actively in the. enter-
',prise and'opened a "trustee" account with the bank. All 
;funds collected by: Mr.' Gray from milk sales, less certain 
expenses and salaries, were delivered to him, and he had 
'complete control of· this money. In the beginning from $30 
·to$35 wasturned over to him daily, but the receipts dwindled 
to' nothing' in a period of approximately sixty days because 
the producers' were dissatisfied and supplied less and less 
milk. Petitioner drew. checks on the "trustee" account in 
.) 
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favor of the producers and others. Some of these checks 
were returned for insufficient funds. After the institution 
of criminal proceedings part were paid; others still remain 
unpaid. Demands were made upon petitioner for an ac-
counting and on numerous occasions he promised to furnish 
it, but failed to do so. It was not until JUly 25, 1940, at the 
last hearing before the local committee in the present pro-
ceeding, that he explained for the first time that he was 
unable to make an accounting because his records had been 
destroyed in a flood at Tujunga. The record substantiates 
the committee's finding that this was improbable. 
Between August and December, 1938, petitioner undertook 
to represent the producers in litigation arisiug out of their 
ubandonment of the plant leased by them and the unsuc-
cessful operation of their business from February to Sep-
tember, 1938. Three suits were brought against the pro-
ducers. In Kurtz v. Wassenaar et al., L. A. MuniCipal Court 
No. 484,614» an action for rent, there was no defense, and a 
default judgment was entered against the producers in May, 1939. ) 
In Guernsey Gold Seal v. Wassenaar, L. A. Municipal 
Court No. 497,197, petitioner served and :tiled an answer 
and cross-complaint on behalf of the producers. The plain-
tiff, however, without the knowledge of petitioner, secured 
from each of the defendant producers an affidavit denying 
petitioner's authority to represent them. Upon the basis 
of these affidavits a motion to strike the answers and cross-
complaints was granted, and a default judgment was entered. 
Apparently the prodUcers did not fully understand the 
meaning or possible effect of their affidavits, but, so far as 
the evidence shows, petitioner was entitled to and did rely 
Upon them. He therefore advised the counsel for the plain-
tiff in the third action (Keeley v. Wassenaar et al., Los An-
geles Superior Court 'No. 433,791), in which he had been 
securing oral and written extensions of the time for appear-
ance, that his authority to represent the defendant pro-
ducers had been repUdiated. 
The evidence regarding petitioner's failure to defend the 
1ega) actions properly and regarding other phases of the 
matters charged Was inconclusive, and the local committee 
concluded that petitioner did not violate his duties as an 
attorney in any of the respects charged except in his refusal 
11'/ 
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and failure. to account for funds handled from. August to 
O<!tober, 1938. Petitioner offered no credible explanation for 
his' failure, to· keep' a record of the funds received by him 
in trust, for the producers and disbursed by him on their 
behalf. The lack of any financial statement or report made 
it impossible to determine whether petitioner had actually 
misappropriated any of the funds entrusted to him and his 
excuses for this negligent handling of his client's affairs 
only beclouded the question. 
[3] The findings and conclusions of the committee are 
amply supported by direct evidence of petitioner's failure 
to account' and other acts of negligence and omission. Pe-
titioner contends, however, . that even if the committee's con-
clusions are correct, his violations of duty involved no moral 
turpitude and were not of sufficient consequence to serve 
as the basis of either a prolonged suspension or disbarment. 
He argues that as he was neither the collector of sales re-
ceipts nor the bookkeeper for the business, he was under no 
obligation to produce a record of the funds of his clients 
which were delivered to him in trust and disbursed by him 
under his. complete control. This argument demonstrates a 
lack of understanding of the. duties and obligations arising 
out of a fiduciary relationship. It would be a distortion of 
justice to permit· a trustee, or attorney handling funds of a 
client, to escape responsibility by the simple act of not 
keeping any record or data from which an accounting might 
be made. 
Repeated . acts of negligence and omission may involve 
moral turpitude and prove as great a lack of fitness to prac-
tice law as affirmative violations of duty. (Marsh v. State 
Bar, 210 Cal. 303 [291 Pac. 583] ; Marsh v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 
(2d) 75. [39 Pac. (2d) 403] ; Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 
(2d) ·17 [63Pac~' (2d) 1133]; Trusty v. State Bar, supra.) 
The evidence here discloses a complete disregard for the 
fiduciary relation of an' attorney to his clients and an ab-
sence of fair dealing in handling the affairs of ignorant, 
credulous, or impecunious clients. (See Stanford v. State 
Bar, 15 Cal. (2d) 721 [104 Pac. (2d) 635].) 
'; . The consolidated record of the present proceedings, 'con-
sidered in conjunction with petitioner's past record (Bruns 
v. State Bar, supra)~ attests the correctness of the conclu-
sion that. the public interest will be best served and protected 
~ 
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by petitioner's removal from practice. (Marsh v. State Bar, 
2 Cal. (2d) 75 [39 Pac. (2d) 403] ; I{ennedy v. State Bar, 13 
Cal. (2d) 236 [88 Pac. (2d) 920].) Although ten years have 
elapsed since the previous disciplinary proceedings against 
petitioner, in which he, was suspended for a period of three 
months for deliberately misleading the court by a false aver-
ment as to custody of a minor in a petition for adoption, it is 
apparent that the discipline then administered did not suc-
ceed in imparting to him an understanding of the duties of 
an attorney to his clients and to. the public. 
It is ordered that petitioner be disbarred from the practice 
of law in the courts of this state, effective thirty days after 
the filing of this decision. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting._I dissent. 
While the facts found by the local administrative com-
mittee with reference to the misrepresentation made by pe-
titioner that he had filed an action on behalf of his client 
when he had not done so, and his failure to render an ac-
counting of money received by him in trust are sufficient to 
justify disciplinary action against him, I cannot agree with 
the holding in the majority opinion that a member of the 
bar can be subjected to a disciplinary proceeding for mere 
negligent conduct. 
I still hold to the views expressed by me in my dissenting 
opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal. (2d) 
550, 554 [107 Pac. (2d) 10], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal. 
(2d) 610, 612 [107 Pac. (2d) 258], and I disagree with 
everything said in the majority opinion in the instant case 
contrary to the views expressed by me in said dissenting opinions. 
Houser, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied October 
30, 1941. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
18 o. (2d)-22 
